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 Implicit Balancing in the Adjudication of  
Criminal Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a commonly understood notion of American law that, at all 
stages of criminal proceedings, the “judge has an affirmative . . . duty” to 
“safeguard the due process rights of the accused.”1 This duty did not 
materialize out of thin air. Safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants 
is, in fact, a constitutional duty vested in the judiciary by way of the 
long-standing tradition that judges are entrusted with interpreting and 
applying the rights and guarantees of the Constitution.2 But whenever 
they interpret and apply constitutional provisions, judges understand that 
they face a stark reality: the acceptance and viability of their decisions 
rest on a general perception of legitimacy.3 Having “no influence over 
either the sword or the purse,” courts lack the ability to “take [any] active 
resolution whatever,”4 and possess “as their only stock in trade moral 
authority.”5 
In other words, for courts’ decisions to be viewed as credible, it is 
not enough for the public to know merely that judges are functionally 
competent to render decisions. Rather, the public must believe that judges 
are making unbiased and legally consistent decisions.6 In order for the 
 
 1. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979); see Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 
434, 443 (1977) (“[C]ourts have the solemn responsibility . . . to safeguard constitutional rights . . . 
.” (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974))); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 
68 (1965) (“Our Constitution places in the hands of the trial judge the responsibility for safeguarding 
the integrity of the jury trial . . . .”). 
 2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). “John Marshall’s famous opinion in 
Marbury . . . established the Court as the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution,” MARK 
SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION 35 
(1994), and, accordingly, as the ultimate protector of constitutional liberties. 
 3. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794–
96 (2005) (discussing courts’ ability to make decisions as a sociological concept, dependent on the 
public’s acceptance of their decisions as legitimate). 
 4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961). 
 5. Kim Lane Scheppele, Univ. of Pa., The Function of Constitutional Courts: Techniques of 
Judicial Empowerment, Panel Discussion at AALS and American Political Science Association 
Conference on Constitutional Law (June 7, 2002), available at http://www.aals.org/profdev/ 
constitutional/schepple.html. 
 6. See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 
IOWA L. REV. 181, 199 (2011) (“An appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds, with 
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public to interpret judicial decisions as correct, those decisions must be 
devoid of the appearance of bias.7  
Those familiar with the common-law system understand that legal 
reasoning sometimes cannot be accomplished with precision. When a 
more rigid, formulaic approach to judging does not work, one alternative 
is judicial balancing—a method of decision making that “has reached the 
point where it is the dominant judicial style that characterizes this era.”8 
In balancing, judges attempt to give appropriate weight to the competing 
interests and values at play in cases before them.9 Although balancing of 
competing interests is viewed as a primarily legislative function,10 it has 




The role of judicial balancing has expanded over time.11 Given the 
 
knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that 
the judge’s honesty, integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is impaired.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2A cmt. 
(2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 7. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 
671, 686–87 (2011). Scholars have noted at length that actual bias in judicial decision making has 
been—and continues to be—an issue of serious concern to both the general public and to the 
judiciary itself. See id. at 672–73. Dean Geyh notes that several legal organizations, including the 
American Bar Association, have devoted time and resources to analyzing the problem of judicial 
bias. He also notes that this issue is of interest to the general public, given that popular author John 
Grisham used the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent and highly controversial decision in Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), as the basis for his recent novel, The Appeal. While actual 
bias is a key concern, this paper focuses on the appearance of bias in the judiciary. This distinction 
is profound, most notably because an unbiased decision can appear biased in some circumstances. As 
explained below, this Comment argues that apparent bias should equally share the spotlight, 
especially as judicial balancing takes a more prominent role in judicial decision making. 
 8. Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
16, 17 (1988). 
 9. Id. at 17, 19. 
 10. See Anthony E. Chavez, The Red and Blue Golden State: Why California’s Proposition 
11 Will Not Produce More Competitive Elections, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 311, 369 (2011) (“The Supreme 
Court has recognized that legislatures exercise political judgment in balancing competing interests, 
and that legislatures are the institutions ‘best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state 
policies’ . . . .” (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977))). 
 11. See Coffin, supra note 8, at 18. (“[T]he onset of more general balancing by the Supreme 
Court began in the late 1960s, intensified in the 1970s, and [became] commonplace in the 1980s. 
Now there are bellwether balancing cases applying both to content-based and content-neutral 
limitations on speech (first amendment); to all aspects of search, seizure, warrants, and the 
exclusionary rule (fourth amendment); to double jeopardy and the privilege against self-
incrimination (fifth amendment); to the right to a public jury trial (sixth amendment); to excessive 
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expanded role of balancing in judicial decision making, it is reasonable 
to assert that ostensibly there is nothing wrong with judicial balancing of 
competing interests in itself.12 But when a judge has to make decisions in 
criminal proceedings, the task of balancing can be particularly trying 
because of the fundamental due-process rights at stake.13 Knowing one 
of her key duties is to safeguard these due-process rights at trial,14 the 
judge must somehow answer a litany of difficult questions. What rights 
should she consider? What rights—if any—are so important that they 
should not be balanced against other interests? Which of the many 
competing state interests should be factored into the equation? At what 
point does the scale tip in favor of protecting a defendant’s rights over 
serving the competing public and governmental interests, or vice versa?  
The balancing problem is further complicated, and additional 
questions arise, when one considers the ever-looming burden of 
maintaining the appearance of legitimacy. Knowing that the public is 
increasingly able to keep tabs on every decision she renders,15 the judge 
must consider exactly what individuals or groups comprise the public—
lawmakers, special interest groups, police agencies, people in general, or 
some combination of the above. Regardless of the tack she takes, the 
judge must continually evaluate the effect her actions have on the overall 
perception of the court’s legitimacy.  
This Comment analyzes judicial balancing as it relates to judges’ task 
of upholding the appearance of legitimacy. Specifically, it contends that 
judges sometimes implicitly balance—that is, judges weigh often 
significant and determinative factors but leave those factors unidentified 
or unexplained. Because implicit balancing can produce unclear or 
 
bail and cruel and unusual punishment (eighth amendment); and to procedural due process, 
substantive due process and equal protection (fourteenth amendment).”). 
 12. But it may go without saying that some members of the judiciary—most notably and 
vocally, Justice Scalia—disagree on this point. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwestco 
Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that “balancing” is not really a 
weighing of interests at all, but rather “more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a 
particular rock is heavy,” and is “a task squarely within the responsibility of Congress and ‘ill suited 
to the judicial function’”(quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
 13. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 442–43 (1992) (discussing the heightened degree of 
difficulty in balancing due-process rights against state interests in criminal cases as compared to civil 
cases). 
 14. See United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that appellate 
courts rely heavily on the trial-court judge’s discretion to protect the rights of the accused). 
 15. See, e.g., Samira Jafari, Religion in the News, WORLDWIDE RELIGIOUS NEWS, July 19, 
2007, available at http://wwrn.org/articles/25695/?&place=united-states&section=other-groups.  
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nontransparent rationales in judicial decision making, implicit balancing 
likely undermines courts’ appearance of legitimacy in the long run.  
As a microcosm in miniature of implicit judicial balancing and its 
effect on courts’ appearance of legitimacy, a study of sex-offender 
legislation provides an excellent springboard for a discussion of implicit 
balancing. Sex-offender laws and the crimes prosecuted under them have 
generated much scholarship and vigorous debate over the last two 
decades.16 A significant portion of that scholarship has focused on the 
legislation itself, discussing the weakening of due-process protections 
and constitutional liberties in enforcing civil commitment laws,17 as well 
as the legislative role in advancing the modern sex-offender-legislation 
movement and the political motivations behind those laws.18 Further, 
much literature has explored the post-incarceration effect of this 
legislation on convicted sex offenders and questioned its effectiveness in 
mitigating recidivism or facilitating rehabilitation.19 But while scholars 
have made substantial contributions to both constitutional and functional 
problems associated with these laws, sex-offender legislation’s impact on 
criminal defendants in the courtroom has been largely ignored—
specifically when judges apply these laws during various stages of 
pretrial, trial, and sentencing proceedings.20  
This Comment attempts to fill the void by taking a novel approach to 
the sex-offender debate, focusing on the courtroom application of these 
laws by judges. It argues that judges sometimes implicitly balance 
competing government and individual interests—that is, where it is not 
 
 16. See, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 1535 (2004) (discussing the racial ramifications of sex-offender laws); Roxanne Lieb et al., 
Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43 (1998) (describing legal terminology’s 
effect on the public perception of sex offenders); Clare McGlynn, Feminism, Rape and the Search 
for Justice, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 825 (2011); Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An 
Economic Perspective on Megan’s Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355 (2005) (discussing the use of 
shaming techniques as a method of punishing sex offenders); Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil 
Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253 (2011) (analyzing the derogation of due process in the 
civil-commitment context); Jeslyn A. Miller, Comment, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The 
Treatment Paradox, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2093 (2010) (arguing that treatment methods of civilly-
committed sex offenders result in a self-reinforcing cycle of continuing detention). 
 17. Tsesis, supra note 16. 
 18. ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE 
RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 13 (2006). 
 19. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: 
Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697 (2011). 
 20. Compare Tsesis, supra note 16 (discussing constitutional due-process problems), with 
Hamilton, supra note 19 (discussing the practical implications of sex-offender legislation). 
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mandated by statute or when judges do not clearly identify the factors 
they weigh. It further claims that, in the criminal context, the implicit 
balancing of competing interests may prove problematic on several 
levels. First, it can allow actual bias to creep into the judicial process, 
which may disadvantage the accused. Second, it gives rise to problems 
for society as a whole by allowing constitutional rights to be balanced 
against unannounced or unknown factors. Finally, balancing of this sort 
undermines courts’ appearance of legitimacy in the public eye, making 
their rulings less viable in the long run. 
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part II provides a primer on 
sex-offender laws in the United States, tracking their historical 
development and discussing the mechanisms of control common in many 
state statutory schemes. Part III explains that, because of the substantial 
interests at stake on both sides of the argument, sex-crime and sex-
offender legislation are subjects well suited to a discussion of judicial 
balancing and bias. Part IV submits evidence showing that implicit 
judicial balancing in the sex-offender context may be happening and that 
bias in the judicial system may result therefrom. Part IV also discusses 
the problems that arise for both the accused and society in general when 
judges hearing sex-offender cases implicitly balance. Part V concludes 
with the idea that judges can avoid these problems and ensure 
transparency in the decision-making process by identifying and 
explaining the factors and competing interests that they take into account 
when they balance. By so doing, courts will be better equipped to 
maintain the appearance of legitimacy and neutrality in the eyes of the 
public. 
II. A PRIMER ON SEX-OFFENDER LEGISLATION 
Before an analysis of implicit judicial balancing and the potential for 
bias in the application of sex-offender statutes can go forward, it is 
essential to understand the nature of the laws and competing interests in 
question. This section will provide a brief history of sex-offender 
legislation, introduce the reader to the types of crimes that may lead to 
classification as a “sex offender,” and discuss the legislative mechanisms 
commonly employed to reduce these crimes. 
A. History: Crimes that Gave Rise to Modern Sex-Offender Legislation 
Sex-crime laws in America are as old as the nation itself, and form 
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the bases of our modern sex-offender legislation.21 Yet sex-crime 
legislation as we know it today is a surprisingly recent development—an 
outgrowth of the public’s reaction to a series of particularly heinous and 
highly publicized sex crimes that occurred in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.22 In two unrelated instances in 1988 and 1989, two convicted sex 
offenders, recently released from state prison in Washington, raped and 
brutally murdered a Seattle woman and a seven-year-old boy.23 The 
public’s reaction to these crimes was strong and its message clear: the 
state had failed to take requisite action to preserve public safety, and 
something had to be done to root out the “worst of the worst” from local 
communities.24 The result of this public outcry was the passage of 
Washington’s Community Protection Act of 1990, which used civil 
commitments and the tracking of sex offenders through registration 
programs as the primary tools for enforcing its provisions.25 
In 1994, about five years after the Washington rape-murders, a 
seven-year-old girl in New Jersey named Megan Kanka was brutally 
raped and murdered by her neighbor who, unbeknownst to the girl’s 
parents, was a twice-convicted sex offender.26 These two facts—that the 
neighbor was a recidivist offender and that the state of New Jersey had 
failed to inform the Kankas of that fact—sparked significant public 
outrage.27 The Kanka rape-murder received national media attention and 
“gave impetus to laws for mandatory registration of sex offenders and 
corresponding community notification.”28 That same year, Congress 
passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Act, which “condition[ed] certain federal 
 
 21. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA 16 (2008) (noting 
that rape, adultery, and sodomy were considered capital offenses under the legal code of the 
Jamestown Settlement). 
 22. JANUS, supra note 18, at 13–14. 
 23. Id. at 14. 
 24. See Jim Simon, Senate Sends Sex Offender Bill to House, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 25, 1990), 
http://bit.ly/MYX8z8. The public outcry against these crimes is perhaps more understandable when 
one considers that in the case of the seven-year-old boy, “the offender had explicitly threatened, in 
his prison diaries, to commit just such brutality.” JANUS, supra note 18, at 14. 
 25. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (2011). Although not contemporaneous with the 
Washington legislation, Minnesota enacted a substantially similar law in response to a set of vicious 
rape-murders that occurred there. JANUS, supra note 18, at 15; MINN. STAT. §§ 243.167, 253B.185 
(2011). 
 26. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003) (describing the story of Megan Kanka and its 
relationship to subsequent state SVP legislation). 
 27. JANUS, supra note 18, at 15. 
 28. Smith, 538 U.S. at 89. 
09-ARNSON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:42 PM 
969 Implicit Balancing in the Adjudication of Criminal Law 
 975 
law enforcement funding on the States’ adoption of sex offender 
registration laws and set[] minimum standards for state programs.”29 
Unsurprisingly, the states wasted little time in responding to the new 
federal registration and reporting requirements. By 1996, all fifty states, 
the District of Columbia, and the federal government had added some 
version of a “Megan’s Law” to their criminal codes.30 
B. Classification: Who Are “Sex Offenders”? 
Although state criminal codes vary in terms of their precise legal 
definitions, an individual convicted of a crime that satisfies the 
applicable statutory requirements is classified as a “sex offender.”31 
While the types of crimes that warrant such a designation may seem 
apparent to the layperson, the term itself can be rather nuanced. Although 
a “sex offender” may have been convicted of a sex crime in one of the 
more traditionally known categories—rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse 
of a minor, etc.32—state legislatures have not defined the term quite so 
narrowly.  
In fact, some state laws require individuals who commit crimes that 
have no sexual component whatsoever to register as sex offenders. For 
example, in 2001, James Smith, a seventeen-year-old resident of 
 
 29. Id. at 89–90. 
 30. Id. at 90. Interestingly, Ida Ballasiotes, the mother of the Seattle woman who was 
murdered, ran for and took office in the Washington State Legislature, centering her campaign on 
getting “tough on crime.” Ballasiotes served on a task force that led to passage of the Washington 
Community Protection Act. See Steve Miletich, Inmates Fight a State Bite on Their Gifts; 35% Is 
Taken off the Top of All the Money They Are Sent, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 7, 1997, at 
A1; Daniel T. Satterberg, 20 Year Anniversary of Washington’s Community Protection Act, KING 
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://www.kingcounty.gov/Prosecutor/news/2010/january/anniversary.aspx. Richard Kanka, the 
father of Megan Kanka and driving force behind the passage of Megan’s Law, is currently 
campaigning for election to the New Jersey Senate on a similar platform. Erin Duffy, Republican 
Richard Kanka, Who Pushed for Megan’s Law, Announces N.J. Senate Bid in 14th District, NJ.COM 
(Apr. 5, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf 
/2011/04/republican_richard_kanka_annou.html. 
 31. I use the term “sex offender” here to reference the exceptionally broad and varied group 
of individuals who have been convicted under federal or state sex-crime law and classified as 
sexually deviant in some manner. In reality, the nomenclature varies widely, depending on the 
statutory provisions in question and the severity of the offense committed. Rather than become mired 
in the distinctions between the various levels and classifications of sexual deviance (which do not 
relate to the subject of this Comment), I collectively refer to the group of individuals in question as 
“sex offenders.” 
 32. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.35, .65, .75 (McKinney 2010) (rape, sexual abuse, and 
course of sexual conduct against a child considered “sex offenses”). 
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Wisconsin, forced another seventeen-year-old male into a car with him, 
intent on using the boy as a hostage to collect drug money from the boy’s 
friend.33 Having pled guilty to false imprisonment, it was undisputed that 
Smith committed the crime in question.34 What surprised many members 
of the public, however, was that Smith would be forced to register as a 
sex offender for life; under Wisconsin’s sex-registry statute, false 
imprisonment of a minor is a crime deserving of placement on the state 
registry.35 The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently upheld Smith’s 
conviction, finding that the statutory provision was rationally related to 
the state’s legitimate interest in protecting children and the public and in 
aiding law enforcement.36 
More serious sex crimes warrant a different appellation in most 
jurisdictions—specifically, those crimes deemed “sexually violent” or 
“predatory” in nature.37 For these crimes, either an act of violence in the 
form of injury to the victim, or the repeated commission of a crime that 
would normally rise only to the level of a “sexual offense” is an almost 
universal requirement.38 Because of the serious ramifications of 
classifying a person as “sexually violent” or “predatory,” most states 
impose heightened requirements for adjudicating an individual to be as 
such, including (1) an underlying conviction for a sexually violent crime, 
(2) a “mental abnormality” or “mental disorder,” and (3) a high risk of 
re-offense if released back into the community.39 It was crimes of this 
nature—those committed by “predatory” individuals—that spawned 
much of the modern legislation in the sex-crime arena.40 
 
 33. Bruce Vielmetti, Supreme Court Upholds Sex Offender Registration for Non-Sex Crime, 
JSONLINE (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/88699992 .html. 
 34. WIS. STAT. § 940.30 (2011). 
 35. Id. § 301.45 (“‘Sex offense’ means a violation, or the solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt 
to commit a violation . . . of [the false imprisonment statute] if the victim was a minor and the person 
who committed the violation was not the victim’s parent.”). 
 36. Wisconsin v. Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, 96, 106 (Wis. 2010). 
 37. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.95 (McKinney 2010) (“predatory sexual assault” 
different in kind from other sex offenses). 
 38. See, e.g., id. 
 39. See, e.g., Peter C. Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States’ Civil Commitment of Sex 
Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2229, 2232 (2003). 
 40. Supra Part II.A. As previously mentioned, although these crimes are different in name 
and in kind from other crimes, the term “sex offender” will still be used instead of “sexually violent 
predator” or some other appellation. See supra note 31. 
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C. Legislation: Mechanisms for the Control and Reduction of Recidivism 
Each state code may differ greatly because the Constitution reserves 
to the states the power to create and implement their own criminal 
codes.41 Curiously though, the laws that govern the incapacitation and 
regulation of sex offenders are strikingly similar. Provisions that 
typically carry over from state to state include civil-commitment 
proceedings—for individuals deemed too dangerous to be released from 
prison back into the community—and sex-offender-registration 
requirements, including housing and employment restrictions that govern 
where a registered sex offender may live and work. State legislatures 
frequently employ these statutory tools to regulate sex offenders. Each 
will be described in turn. 
1. Civil commitments 
In constructing their statutory schemes, a number of states utilize 
involuntary civil commitments as the primary means of incapacitating 
the most violent sex offenders.42 By definition, civil-commitment laws 
and proceedings allow the state—specifically, a judge—to “deprive an 
individual of his liberty and compel him to accept psychiatric treatment,” 
even though the course of his jail or prison sentence may be complete.43 
Civil-commitment laws are largely creatures of the legislature and 
not of common-law legal tradition.44 As far back as the 1930s, states 
utilized “sex psychopath laws” to govern the treatment of sexually 
deviant defendants, with “their espoused purpose [being] to create an 
alternative to punishment for a certain subclass of sex offenders, those 
‘too sick to deserve punishment.’”45 In large measure, these laws 
fulfilled their purpose and had one overarching principle in mind: the 
infliction of mild punishment is better than too harsh a punishment (or in 
the alternative, better than no punishment at all) for those who are not of 
sufficient mental soundness to be subjected to the traditional mechanisms 
 
 41. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 42. JANUS, supra note 18, at 22. 
 43. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1201 (1974). 
 44. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (“The common law 
had little need to concern itself with questions of adequate procedure for involuntary confinement 
because public institutions for the mentally ill were virtually nonexistent.”), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 
(1974). 
 45. JANUS, supra note 18, at 22 (quoting Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 
1968)). 
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of dispensing justice.46 Interestingly, by the 1970s, many states decided 
that, although noble in theory, their civil-commitment schemes were 
ineffective at treating mental illness or reducing recidivism rates among 
sexually deviant offenders.47 Thus, by the 1980s, most states with sex-
psychopath laws had either repealed the laws or stopped enforcing 
them.48 
But at the inception of the modern sex-offender-legislation 
movement, civil-commitment laws and proceedings gained new traction 
in a big way. With a renewed fervor, the states began passing or 
enforcing civil-commitment laws, specifically in relation to their 
sex-offender statutory schemes.49 There was, notably, one key difference 
from the wave of laws passed in the 1930s. While the focus of the “sex 
psychopath laws” of yesteryear was the mild punishment of mentally ill 
individuals, the driving forces behind  
 
modern sex-offender laws were protecting public safety and mitigating 
the risk of recidivism.50  
Faced with an infuriated public, state legislatures believed 
civil-commitment laws were the best way to get the most dangerous sex 
offenders out of their citizens’ communities and prevent those offenders 
from acting again.51 Deeming these incarcerations “civil” instead of 
“criminal” allowed states to achieve this purpose, as many of the 
constitutional safeguards associated with criminal proceedings—the right 
to a jury trial, the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt evidentiary standard, 
or any of the other procedural-due-process rights that are guaranteed 
when the State attempts to deprive a person of “life, liberty, or 
property”—no longer applied.52 As a civil matter, the government could 
hold the proceeding while the offender was still imprisoned, render 
judgment, and commence the civil-commitment term the day the 
offender’s normal sentence terminated.53 Outside the post-incarceration 
 
 46. See FRED COHEN, THE LAW OF DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL CONTROL 
286–87 (1980) (detailing the treatment of the insane in asylums, including those who otherwise 
would have otherwise gone to jail). 
 47. JANUS, supra note 18, at 22. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 23. 
 52. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Tsesis, supra note 16. 
 53. Tsesis, supra note 16, at 256–57. 
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context, a state may sometimes commit individuals “based on the 
diagnoses of psychiatrists, emergency room doctors, and sometimes even 
psychiatric nurses or licensed social workers.”54 
The civil label on these commitments also afforded legislatures the 
benefit of indefinite sentencing terms. Because these proceedings were 
civil in nature, the criminal safeguards of proportionality and legality did 
not play a role in determining the length of time for which a previously 
incarcerated offender would spend involuntarily committed in a 
mental-health facility.55 With public safety and risk mitigation as their 
driving motives to pass sex-offender laws of this nature, rather than the 
actual treatment of mentally ill offenders, indefinite incarceration periods 
made legislatures more willing to use civil commitment as a tool to 
incapacitate sex offenders, in spite of evidence that suggested these 
commitments might not be effective.56 Thus, in enacting sex-offender 
legislation, the civil commitment of recidivist (or potentially recidivist) 
offenders was, and continues to be, a popular mechanism for 
incapacitation and regulation, which the Supreme Court on multiple 
occasions has held to be fully within the purview of the Constitution.57 
2. Registration and notification requirements 
Registration requirements, including housing and job restrictions, are 
the second major legislative tool. All fifty states and the District of 
Columbia employ registration requirements.58 These registration systems 
serve two primary purposes: (1) allowing state governments to track the 
residence and movement of sex offenders who have been convicted and 
later released back into the community and (2) providing the public with 
notice that a convicted sex offender either has or soon will take up 
residence within the community.59  
 
 54. Id. at 256. 
 55. See id. at 304. 
 56. See JANUS, supra note 18, at 22–23. 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346 (1996). 
 58. Sex Offender Registries, PANDORA’S BOX, http://www.prevent-abuse-
now.com/register.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 59. Brian J. Telpner, Note, Constructing Safe Communities: Megan’s Laws and the Purposes 
of Punishment, 85 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2050 (1997) (“The essence of many community ‘notification’ 
statutes is to facilitate public access to information that local police may have already collected 
through their state’s registration requirement.” These notification statutes may either “create ‘active’ 
notification, which requires police to notify the public directly, or ‘passive’ notification, which 
merely allows the public to inspect relevant information.”). 
09-ARNSON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:42 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
980 
The Supreme Court has found that these primary ends are legitimate 
government purposes and has upheld the enforcement of registration 
laws as a valid exercise of governmental authority.60 The Court has also 
held that because these requirements are, like commitment proceedings, 
considered civil in nature, community registration-and-notification laws 
are “nonpunitive,” and therefore their “retroactive application does not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause” of the Constitution.61 
Although requirements vary from state to state, Georgia’s 
requirements are representative of community-notification laws 
generally. Once convicted sex offenders re-enter the community, they are 
required to register with the appropriate state authority62 and to renew 
their registration annually.63 Upon registration and renewal, an offender 
must submit or update his or her name, social-security number, age, race, 
sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair color, eye color, fingerprints, 
photograph, place of employment, vehicle information, and the crime for 
which the offender is registering.64 The most pertinent identification 
information, such as name, gender, height, weight, and address, is made 
available to the public, and all of it is made available to state 
law-enforcement officials.65 As in other states, the penalties for failing to 
register or renew registration in Georgia can be quite severe: failure to 
comply with registration laws within seventy-two hours of the specified 
time period results in a felony conviction and a mandatory minimum 
sentence of at least one year; any subsequent violation carries a five-year 
minimum sentence.66 
As a part of notification and registration requirements, sex offenders 
are often prevented from taking up residence within certain areas of the 
town or city in which they live. These restrictions are generally intended 
to discourage re-offense by keeping sex offenders away from certain 
areas that traditionally see a high concentration of minors and children.67 
Georgia prevents registered sex offenders from taking up residence 
 
 60. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 85 (2003). 
 61. Id. at 105–06. 
 62. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(f) (2010). 
 63. Id. § 42-1-12(f)(4). 
 64. Id. § 42-1-12(a)(16). 
 65. Id. § 42-1-12(i). 
 66. Id. § 42-1-12(n). 
 67. See Paula Reed Ward, Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders Popular, but Ineffective, 
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 26, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/08300/922948-85.stm. 
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“within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, church, school, or area 
where minors congregate”;68 other states’ statutes require 2,000 feet.69 
These statutes may also put similar restrictions on what type of 
employment registered sex offenders may hold: in Georgia, sex offenders 
may not be “employed by or volunteer at any child care facility, school, 
or church or by or at any business or entity that is located within 1,000 
feet of a child care facility, a school, or a church.”70 
 
III. WHY SEX-OFFENDER LEGISLATION IS RELEVANT TO A DISCUSSION 
OF JUDICIAL BALANCING 
As discussed previously, judicial balancing of competing interests 
happens in all sorts of cases and contexts, both civil and criminal.71 
Sex-offender cases are particularly relevant to a discussion of judicial 
decision making for three reasons. First, the seriousness of the crimes in 
question engenders concerns about the competing interests of both the 
defendant and the government. Second, although sex crime appears to be 
decreasing overall, the number of individuals registered as sex offenders 
continues to rise. Third, many sex-crime prosecutions involve youth 
offenders, making the balancing of competing interests even more 
complex and precarious. 
A. Interests in Heightened Competition 
First, sex crimes are generally considered among the most heinous 
crimes a person can commit,72 which raises the stakes in protecting the 
public interest. Yet, as in all criminal trials, due process is at issue.73 The 
heightened public-safety concern amplifies the degree of competition 
between the defendant’s due-process rights and the government’s interest 
in protecting the public from recidivist offenders.  
Governments have a legitimate interest in protecting the public from 
dangerous and predatory recidivists and in maintaining a sense of 
 
 68. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b). 
 69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-11 (2011). 
 70. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(c). 
 71. See Coffin, supra note 8, at 18. 
 72. JANUS, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 73. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (holding that criminal defendants in all cases—
state or federal—must be afforded due-process guarantees). 
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security in American communities.74 Problems tend to arise in 
determining exactly who the truly dangerous criminals are, and what 
steps can and should be taken to mitigate risk, especially given the 
public’s perception of who sex offenders are and the types of crimes they 
commit.75 Considering the nature of the crimes in question, the 
consequences of releasing these individuals back into the community 
without tracking their movements when they are released are 
astronomically high. Indeed, evidence of the heightened interest in public 
safety is demonstrated in the language legislators used when passing sex-
offender laws in individual states across the country. For example, when 
pressed on the issue, former state legislator Ida Ballasiotes avowed that 
no sexual predator should be released back into the community.76 
Believing that sexually violent offenders “can[not] be treated, period,” 
Ballasiotes stated that extensions of prison sentences through civil 
commitments should “absolutely” be considered as a mechanism 
employed by states to deter and prevent reoffense.77  
Other state legislators have employed similar language to appeal to 
the fear of recidivism and the desire for public safety to keep high-risk 
offenders detained after their sentences run.78 For states, the apparent 
knowledge that they are getting near “100 percent protection from real, 
identified individuals” who are guaranteed not to reoffend as long as they 
remain committed or monitored justifies the action.79 Thus, it seems that 
the keen interest in public safety in sex-offender cases justifies viewing 
the due-process rights of the accused as if they exist in “an alternate legal 
universe,” treating this class of cases as different in kind from others.80 
On the other hand, due-process rights do not simply dissipate 
because of a heightened interest in public safety, for “[a]t the core of 
 
 74. Morascini v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 675 A.2d 1340, 1352 (Conn. 1996) (finding that 
government has a substantial interest in preserving public safety). 
 75. JANUS, supra note 18, at 2. (“The . . . crimes [these] men are accused of mark them as the 
‘worst of the worst.’ . . . These are the men who lurk in the bushes and the parking lots, attacking 
strangers without provocation or warning. They often seem to lack the essential empathy and 
conscience that mark human beings. They are ‘monsters’ and ‘beasts.’”) 
 76. Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at 1.1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/ 
04/us/04civil.html. 
 77. Id. 
 78. E.g., JANUS, supra note 18, at 60 (quoting Minnesota state representative Kurt Zeller: 
“What is the price of yet another victim, the innocence stolen from another child, the sense of safety 
at night for yet another woman?”). 
 79. Id. at 61. 
 80. Id. at 32. 
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procedural justice is the individual’s interest in remaining free from 
erroneous bodily restraint and being protected against arbitrary 
government abuses.”81 Given that “[s]tandards of due process are meant 
to provide sufficiently rigorous standards of proof to prevent the 
wrongful deprivation of liberty,” which is frequently at issue in 
sex-offender legislation, a state’s assertion of heightened safety interest 
does not completely relax due-process guarantees.82 Thus, because the 
due-process rights are retained, and yet the interest in public safety is 
exceptionally high, the method by which judges make decisions in these 
cases becomes a matter of increased importance. 
B. Rising Sex-Offender Registration Rates 
Second, although sex crime appears to be decreasing overall, the 
number of individuals registered as sex offenders keeps rising. While the 
national rate of forcible rape, for example, has decreased steadily from 
94,000 in 2005 to 88,000 in 2009,83 over 747,000 individuals in the 
United States are registered sex offenders,84 up from 603,000 in 2007.85 
State statistics show an increase in sex-offender registrations as well. A 
recent report from Iowa’s Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice 
Planning shows that “[t]he number of people convicted . . . for sex 
crimes has grown for each of the last five years,” and that this increase in 
crime “will increase the parole caseload by 78 percent in 10 years.”86 
The obvious implication of this fact is that judges will adjudicate sex-
 
 81. Tsesis, supra note 16, at 260. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2009 tbl.1, available 
at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_01.html. 
 84. NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Map of Registered Sex Offenders 
in the United States, MISSINGKIDS.COM (Nov. 4, 2011), http:// 
www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/sex-offender-map.pdf. During the drafting and editing of 
this Comment, this figure increased by 7,000 in only about five months, from just under 740,000 on 
June 17, 2011, to 747,000 on November 4, 2011. 
 85. See John Gramlich, The Ever-Growing Sex Offender Registry, STATELINE (Apr. 12, 
2010), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=476264. 
 86. Lee Rood, Iowa Sex Offender Convictions Rise—And So Do Costs, DES MOINES REG. 
BLOG (Oct. 24, 2011, 11:29 AM), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php 
/2011/10/24/iowa-sex-crime-convictions-rise-and-so-do-costs/. Although an inverse relationship 
between sex crimes and sex-offender registrations may seem counterintuitive, there may be any 
number of reasons for such an effect, not the least of which may be the generally long length of time 
sex offenders must remain on sex-offender registries, see supra Part II.C, and the variety of crimes 
that are nonsexual in nature but nevertheless require individuals to register as sex offenders, see 
supra Part II.B. 
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offender cases at an increasing rate over the next several years. 
Considering the high number of cases being prosecuted, and the fact the 
number of new cases are unlikely to decrease in the near future, courts 
face a difficult task when it comes to adjudicating sex-crime cases. This 
makes the way judges are making their decisions in sex-offender cases 
all the  
 
more important if the goal is to keep those decisions consistent with 
constitutional principles. 
C. The Relative Age of Some Sex Offenders 
Finally, another statistic that lends support to the argument that the 
method of judicial decision making is of importance in the sex-offender 
context is that many individuals prosecuted for sex crimes are relatively 
young. In California, for example, the defendant was age twenty or 
younger in 30% of the approximately 17,000 statutory rape cases 
prosecuted.87 Sample cases of minors who are prosecuted for sex crimes 
abound. Shane Sandborg, a resident of Illinois, engaged in a “consensual 
sexual relationship” at age seventeen with a girl fourteen months younger 
than he, and she became pregnant.88 In the course of an investigation for 
another crime, the police discovered Sandborg’s relationship with the 
girl, and he was charged with criminal sexual abuse.89 As a result, even 
though Sandborg is now married and raising three children with this 
same woman, Sandborg remains on Illinois’ sex-offender registry for 
“the crime of having sex with a minor”—preventing him from attending 
his children’s school functions or going to the park as a family.90  
For youth, such an ignominious designation can have enormous 
ripple effects on individuals in many aspects of their day-to-day lives for 
years into the future, making the method of judicial decision making in 
the sex-offender context all the more important.91 Considering this fact, 
 
 87. CAL. COAL. AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT, 2008 REPORT: RESEARCH ON RAPE AND 
VIOLENCE 51 (2008), available at http://www.calcasa.org/stat/CALCASA_Stat_2008.pdf. 
 88. Illinois ‘Romeo and Juliet’ Law Would Take Young Sex Offenders Off Registry, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2011, 1:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/ 02/illinois-
romeo-and-juliet_n_830301.html. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Henry F. Fradella & Marcus A. Galeste, Sexting: The Misguided Penal Social Control 
of Teenage Sexual Behavior in the Digital Age, 47 NO. 3 CRIM. LAW BULL. ART. 4 (2011) (noting 
reasons why penal social-control mechanisms may be inappropriate for teenagers). 
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and combined with the nature of the competing interests at stake and the 
rise in sex crimes generally, sex-offender cases prove to be an excellent 
springboard for analysis of the process of judicial decision making. 
 
IV. IMPLICIT JUDICIAL BALANCING:  
EVIDENCE AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS 
The sex-offender context thus is an excellent candidate for analysis 
of implicit judicial balancing. As previously mentioned, this Comment 
defines implicit balancing as that which is accomplished either without 
statutory mandate or without judicial identification of the factors 
weighed.92 But what evidence demonstrates that implicit balancing—that 
is, balancing not accomplished by statutory mandate or without clear 
identification of the factors weighed—is actually happening in sex-
offender cases? And even if implicit judicial balancing is occurring, what 
are the implications and problems associated with it? This Comment 
argues that implicit balancing occurs in the application of sex-offender 
laws. It appears that judges across the country, while presumably 
concerned with protecting the rights of the accused or convicted, are 
engaging in an unexpressed, implicit balancing act in which they weigh 
the competing interests identified above93: the state’s interest in public 
safety and the constitutional due-process guarantees of the accused. 
A. Supporting Evidence 
An examination of court decisions from recently decided 
sex-offender cases provides ample support for these propositions. As a 
preliminary matter, it is important to note that the situations identified 
below may not be the only ones in which implicit balancing occurs. 
Although many federal court decisions are published or, if unpublished, 
are at least available in written form, detailed opinions from the majority 
of state appellate and lower court decisions are often inaccessible in 
writing.94 Furthermore, many of these trial court decisions are not 
 
 92. See supra Part I. 
 93. See supra Part III. 
 94. See, e.g., CAL. R. OF CT. 2.952 (2011) (placing no mandate on state trial court judges for 
recording decisions); Published and Unpublished Case Research Guide, SAN DIEGO COUNTY 
PUBLIC LAW LIBRARY, http://www.sdcll.org/resources/guides/Published_and_ 
Unpublished_Cases.pdf (last visited Sep. 5, 2012) (“[M]any appellate and lower court decisions are 
not published. For example, in fiscal year 2006–07, only about 9% of the majority opinions issued 
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appealed.95 Thus, the amount of case law available to analyze the method 
by which judges make decisions in the sex-offender context is frequently 
limited to either federal cases or those state cases that are appealed and 
result in a written opinion. 
1. Explicit balancing 
To better understand what form implicit balancing might take, it is 
useful to briefly see what explicit balancing looks like. Civil-
commitment cases—cases in which judges decide whether to commit an 
individual post-release from prison—are good illustrations of explicit 
balancing. In adjudicating civil commitments, it is presumed that judicial 
balancing will occur. The New Jersey Superior Court of Appeals noted 
that it employs an “exceedingly narrow” scope of review in commitment 
cases, and “gives the utmost deference to the reviewing judge’s 
determination of the appropriate balancing of societal interest and 
individual liberty.”96 The U.S. Supreme Court itself has sanctioned this 
approach, noting that an important part of making due-process 
determinations in civil-commitment cases is looking for the decision that 
“strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the 
legitimate concerns of the state.”97 This appellate sanctioning of the 
balancing approach leaves the judiciary with broad discretion to make 
quasi-legislative determinations about the appropriate balance between 
individual liberties and state interests. 
One example of this balancing is found in the case of Dennis 
Linehan, in which the court balanced a convicted sex-offender’s liberty 
interest with the state’s concern for public safety. After Linehan served 
nearly thirty years in the Minnesota prison system for the rape-murder of 
a girl in the 1960s, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, under the 
state law’s standard, Linehan was fit to be released from the penitentiary 
to a halfway house on the prison grounds, where he was to complete 
mandatory psychological evaluation and counseling to begin the process 
of being released back into the community.98 But in accordance with new 
civil-commitment legislation passed in direct response to Linehan’s 
 
by the California Courts of Appeal were published in California official reporters.”). 
 95. See Charles M. Sevilla, Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Search for Truth, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 526 (1997) (noting “there are not that many” criminal appeals). 
 96. In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 928 A.2d 102, 114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 97. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979). 
 98. JANUS, supra note 18, at 27–30. 
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release, the Minnesota court had to rule on whether to recommit Linehan 
when he had already been found at least partially fit for release.99 In In re 
Linehan, the court analyzed Linehan’s continuing actions while inside 
the halfway house to determine that he was fit to be removed from the 
halfway house to a commitment facility for the sexually dangerous; the 
court cited its own precedent to determine that “[e]ven when treatment is 
problematic, and it often is, the state’s interest in the safety of others is 
no less legitimate and compelling. As long as civil commitment is 
programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due process is 
provided.”100 
In other civil-commitment cases, judges have gone beyond factoring 
due-process rights into the balancing equation and have expressed a 
desire to implement other factors as well. For example, in In re Nelson,101 
the dissenting judges disagreed with the majority’s method of 
determining what standards would be most appropriate in satisfying due 
process in civil-commitment cases. Recognizing that “it is undisputed 
that an individual’s liberty interest is at stake in an involuntary 
commitment proceeding,” the dissenters argued that “[m]ore than the 
individual’s liberty interest is at stake” in proceedings of this nature, with 
other interests including that of “providing care to its citizens who are 
unable because of emotional disorder to care for themselves.”102 Other 
courts, while noting that “those facing . . . commitment[] are entitled to 
due process of law before they can be committed,” are also quick to note 
the “flexible concept” of balancing and the multiplicity of factors that 
courts might choose to weigh, “including the costs and administrative 
burdens” of added protective due-process measures.103 These holdings—
that the state’s interest in safety, police protection, and cost minimization 
may outweigh traditional due-process procedures—are evidence that 
judicial balancing is happening in the sex-offender context, and that 
traditional notions of due process could take a back seat in the process 
depending on how “substantial”104 those state interests are. 
 
 99. Id. at 34. 
 100. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 181 (Minn. 1996) (quoting In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 
910, 916 (Minn. 1994)), vacated sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997). 
101. 408 A.2d 1233 (D.C. 1979). 
 102. Id. at 1239 (Nebeker, J., concurring) (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 426). 
 103. In re Detention of Stout, 150 P.3d 86, 93 (Wash. 2007). 
 104. Morascini v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 675 A.2d 1340, 1352 (Conn. 1996). 
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2. Implicit balancing 
Having examined those instances in which judges explicitly balance 
defendants’ due-process rights against a state’s interest in public safety, 
the analysis of those cases in which judges may be implicitly balancing 
can move forward. Courts may be engaging in such implicit balancing in 
cases in which they decide whether sex-offender laws are either penal or 
nonpenal in nature. In Lesher v. Trent, the defendant filed a writ of 
mandamus seeking to compel the correction of public records,105 arguing 
that the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act’s registration requirement 
was an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment.106 The Appellate 
Court of Illinois disagreed, relying on Illinois Supreme Court precedent 
that “long held” the registration requirement was not a retroactive 
punishment under the ex post facto clause.107 Rather, the court said, the 
fact that the legislature’s stated goal was “to enhance public safety” 
makes the statute not punitive in nature, and “[a]lthough registration does 
impose a burden on those required to register, the burden is not 
substantial enough to constitute punishment.”108  
The above language of the Illinois court indicates implicit balancing. 
Although different in kind from the explicit balancing of due-process 
rights and public safety in In re Linehan,109 the court took into account 
some combination of legislative intent and public-safety concerns that (at 
least partially) led it to ultimately decide that registration was not 
retroactive punishment. The justification for letting public safety trump 
the right to freedom from retroactive punishment may have been 
something specifically related to the defendant or his crime—like the 
way the defendant carried out the crime in question. Or the justification 
may have been something more general—like protecting the public at 
large. One cannot know for sure, because the court implicitly balanced 
two competing interests without clearly explaining the specific factors it 
took into account. 
In a similar case, Roe v. Office of Adult Probation,110 the Second 
Circuit decided Connecticut’s sex-offender notification policy was not 
punishment for ex post facto purposes, holding that the policy was “not 
 
 105. 944 N.E.2d 479, 480 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
 106. Id. at 483. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 484. 
 109. See supra text accompanying notes 102–04. 
 110. 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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excessive in relation to its purpose of enhancing public awareness and 
helping to prevent the recovering offender from harmful relapses.”111 
Again, although not explicitly recognized as such, the language the court 
employed demonstrates how implicit balancing played a part in its 
decision. The court quite clearly gave attention to the government’s 
interest in protecting public safety.112 But, as in Lesher,113 any 
combination of factors might have swayed the court’s ultimate 
conclusion. In fact, it is entirely possible that, standing alone, the court 
thought the notification policy was sufficiently burdensome to justify 
calling it retroactive punishment. Unfortunately, the court provided no 
explanation about the precise nature of the factors it took into account; 
the notification policy was excessively burdensome only “in relation to” 
the government’s interest in protecting public safety.114 Thus, the 
sex-offender ex post facto punishment cases are evidence of those 
situations in which a defendant’s rights in question are subject to implicit 
judicial balancing and pitted against the state’s interest in protecting 
public safety. 
A defendant’s rights are also subjected to implicit balancing when 
judges decide the reasonableness of sentences for sex offenses. Under the 
advisory federal-sentencing guidelines,115 judges may take into account 
a variety of mitigating or aggravating factors that may reduce or enhance 
the recommended sentence.116 Each factor that  
 
judges consider before sentencing, however, must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt by jury trial.117  
For example, in United States v. Shira, a defendant convicted of 
possessing child pornography failed to register as a sex offender under 
applicable federal law after serving his prison sentence, and as a result 
was sentenced to serve another fifteen months in prison.118 The 
defendant argued that the term of the sentence was unreasonable, a point 
 
 111. Id. at 55 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. 
 113. 944 N.E.2d 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch.2, 98 Stat. 1837 
(1984). 
 116. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987041; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 
(2006). 
 117. Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005). 
 118. 286 Fed. App’x 650, 652 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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with which the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.119 In arriving at its decision, 
the court found that the lower court was not remiss in balancing a 
multiplicity of factors that would influence the length of the defendant’s 
sentence, including “the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness 
of the offense, promote respect for the law and provide just punishment; 
to afford adequate deterrence; to protect the public and to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care or 
correctional treatment.”120  
In this case, although the district court did explicitly balance due 
process and public safety by explaining some of the factors it considered, 
the court implicitly balanced the defendant’s rights.121 The court did not, 
however, explain why the defendant’s failure to register substantiated the 
need to take into account seemingly extraneous factors, such as the 
defendant’s need for “educational or vocational training, medical care” or 
even the public’s need for an additional layer of protection.122 Although 
the applicable statute did not require the court to explain its rationale 
entirely, the court did not explain why this particular defendant’s failure 
to register justified an enhanced sentence; implicit balancing leaves one 
in the dark about the court’s rationale. 
Jury selection is another area in which implicit judicial balancing 
may occur. In 2004, Barry Heath was charged with and convicted of the 
rape of a woman with whom he had formerly been romantically 
involved.123 Heath challenged the verdict on the grounds that during voir 
dire, the district court “denied [his peremptory] challenges for cause 
regarding two prospective jurors.,” one of whom had acted “as a rape 
survivor advocate in college and” whose ex-boyfriend had once stalked 
her, and the second of whom “had completed fifty-six hours of 
continuing education on sex offenses.”124 At various points during voir 
dire, the first prospective juror expressed her reservations about serving 
as a juror on the case.125 Despite these reservations, the Montana 
 
 119. Id. at 652–53. 
 120. Id. at 653. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. State v. Heath, 89 P.3d 947, 949 (Mont. 2004). The legal name of the charge was “sexual 
intercourse without consent.” Id. 
 124. Id. at 956. 
 125. Id. at 951–52 (“[I]f I were in [the defendant’s] situation, I probably wouldn’t want 
somebody on the jury that had my experience. . . . I feel I probably shouldn’t be on this particular 
case . . . because of the previous experience that I’ve had and also the experience with rape 
survivors.”). 
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Supreme Court ruled that the trial court’s decision to retain the juror was 
not an abuse of discretion. The court focused solely on the fact that the 
first prospective juror also expressed that she would be “willing and able 
to set [her past experiences] aside.”126 The court cited this as evidence 
that she would be able to form something other than “fixed opinions on 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant” and render an unbiased 
verdict.127 The court implicitly balanced in deciding this case. Relying 
on prior decisions, the court delineated a rule that jurors need to “state[] 
an actual bias directly related to an issue critical to the outcome of the 
case” before they are disqualified.128 While there may be multiple 
explanations that undergird the court’s decision to adopt this rule, (e.g., 
the interest in efficient trials or in keeping jurors on the jury), the court at 
no point expressed its reasoning or policy rationale. The court must have 
considered some combination of state interests that outweighed the 
defendant’s interest in having a jury composed of individuals without 
“admittedly skeptical state[s] of mind.”129 But one cannot know for 
certain because the court implicitly balanced. 
While implicit balancing may adversely impact a defendant’s chance 
for a successful trial or appeal, this is not to say that a test that balances 
competing individual and state interests always disadvantages the 
defendant. Indeed, sometimes implicit balancing works in the 
defendant’s favor.130 But regardless of whether the outcome for sex 
offenders is positive or negative, all of these cases indicate that implicit 
balancing occurs in at least some sex-offender cases. 
B. Problems with the Balancing-Test Approach 
Given the evidence that implicit judicial balancing is happening in 
this context, what is the cause for concern? This Comment suggests that 
the broader problem with implicit balancing is twofold. First, implicit 
balancing creates problems for individual defendants when it pits 
 
 126. Id. at 951. 
 127. Id. at 950 (quoting Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 608 P.2d 116, 120 (Mont. 
1980)); id. at 955. 
 128. Id. at 950 (quoting State v. Freshment, 43 P.3d 968, 974 (Mont. 2002)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 129. Id. at 958 (Leaphart, J., dissenting). 
 130. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1017–18 (Alaska 2008) (holding that, in balancing 
the “consequences to sex offenders” against the state’s interest in public safety, a convict’s state 
constitutional rights are violated when the convict is required to register as a sex offender under the 
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act). 
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constitutional guarantees against asserted state interests and treats both as 
equals without clear regard to the factors used to balance those interests. 
Second, this may create the appearance of judicial bias, which 
undermines the legitimacy of courts and potentially decreases public 
willingness to accept and comply with judicial opinions.131 
First, when judges implicitly weigh competing state interests against 
the defendant’s interests, the defendant’s loss of rights may be 
rationalized in ways unintended by the legislature and in ways that due 
process would not otherwise permit. During the course of any criminal 
proceeding, defendants may invoke any number of constitutional 
protections: the right to a hearing, the right to a trial by a jury, and the 
protection against ex post facto punishments, to name a few.132 This is 
not to say, however, that these rights are absolute. Indeed, as in the civil 
context,133 judges regularly must balance criminal defendants’ rights 
against competing state interests.134 These state interests—namely, 
public safety and reducing recidivism risk—are “important,”135 and even 
“substantial.”136 That balancing happens is not bad in itself, as long as 
the judge remains fair and neutral as to the evidence presented and then 
strikes the appropriate balance to the best of her knowledge and ability; 
no one expects more of a judge than this.137 But while the more familiar 
type of explicit balancing is permissible, implicit balancing is not.  
When judges implicitly balance, they either fail to explain the factors 
they considered or the degree of weight they afforded those factors 
during the decision-making process.138 If a judge strikes the balance in 
favor of state interests in protecting public safety or in reducing the risk 
of recidivism, yet leaves the means of making the decision unexplained, 
the defendant cannot know what weight her rights were afforded. Nor 
can she know with precision going forward when her rights might be 
balanced. Perhaps more importantly, she cannot know why her interests 
took a back seat to other competing state interests. Put simply, the 
 
 131. See generally Fallon, supra note 3 (suggesting that judicial decisions derive their 
legitimacy from public acceptance). 
 132. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amend. V, § 1, amend. VIII. 
 133. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A 
Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 570 (2008). 
 134. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 135. Roe v. Office of Adult Prob., 125 F.3d 47, 54 n.14 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 136. Morascini v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 675 A.2d 1340, 1352 (Conn. 1996). 
 137. Nancy Gertner, On Being Judged: Why the Label “Activist Judge” Doesn’t Apply to Me, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 2011, at BGM.12. 
 138. See supra Part I. 
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implicit, unexplained balancing of defendant and state interests can 
rationalize defendants’ rights at trial and leave defendants with limited 
ability to properly analyze the decision because judges’ reasoning 
processes are left unclear or unexplained. 
Second, implicit balancing may undermine the legitimacy of courts 
in the eyes of Americans and decrease public willingness to accept 
judicial opinions as legitimate.139 This stems from a combination of two 
ideas: that courts must rely on public acceptance of their legitimacy if 
they expect the public to rely on their decisions140 and that the 
appearance of procedural injustice is substantially related to individuals’ 
compliance with laws and judicial decisions.141 The Supreme Court 
stated in no uncertain terms in Planned Parenthood that its legitimacy 
(and, by extension, the legitimacy of other courts) in the eyes of the 
public is the only true power courts wield: 
[T]he Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money 
and . . . it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The 
Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and 
perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary 
as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it 
demands . . . . 
 . . . The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow 
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as 
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and 
political pressures . . . . Thus, the Court’s legitimacy depends on 
making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their 
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the 
Nation.142 
When the Planned Parenthood Court spoke of legitimacy, it did not 
reference the legitimacy of its existence or its ability to decide 
constitutional cases generally. Rather, it spoke of the people’s perception 
of the Court’s ability to decide constitutional cases. The Court focused on 
the people’s perception of its legitimacy.143 Indeed, this is by far the most 
valuable “currency” that courts have at their disposal.144 
 
 139. See generally Fallon, supra note 3. 
 140. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–66 (1992). 
 141. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 
CRIME & JUST. 283, 284 (2003). 
 142. 505 U.S. at 865–66. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1832. 
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This problem—the need to maintain the appearance of legitimacy—
has proved to be an idea that exists not just in theory alone; scholars have 
found “[c]onsiderable evidence [to] suggest[] that the key factor shaping 
public behavior is the fairness of the processes legal authorities use when 
dealing with members of the public.”145 In other words, to ensure 
compliance with their decisions, judges must make sure the public 
perceives those decisions as procedurally fair.146  
Implicit balancing tends to undermine both the appearance of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public and, consequently, the public’s 
compliance with those decisions. A judge in a certain case might view 
punishment as “not excessive in relation to” the state’s asserted interest 
in public safety,147 but the public, like defendants themselves, is left to 
wonder exactly why this is the case. Perhaps the state interest was in fact 
very important, or perhaps there was something particularly unusual or 
heinous about the crime in question; perhaps the judge was simply set on 
making sure a particular defendant got her just deserts. While such 
nefarious actions surely are unlikely, these guesses represent the broad 
range of possible conclusions at which the public might arrive because of 
a lack of transparency inherent in the implicit-balancing process. This 
may have a negative effect on the public’s acceptance and compliance 
with the decisions courts set forth, causing judges to be “unsure whether 
they can issue directives and expect that they will be obeyed.”148 In 
short, when judges engage in implicit balancing, it tends to undermine 
both the appearance of legitimacy and the court’s ability in the long run 
to render decisions that the public will view as legitimate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Implicit judicial balancing appears to occur on a fairly regular basis 
at various points in the judicial process during the adjudication of sex 
crimes.149 Furthermore, that implicit balancing can be problematic both 
for individual defendants and for society in general, as it may rationalize 
defendants’ rights and undermine courts’ appearance of legitimacy in the 
 
 145. Tyler, supra note 140, at 283. 
 146. Professors Tyler, Robinson, and Slobogin have discussed this idea at length and have 
adopted the term “compliance theory” to describe the effect of procedural justice on compliance with 
the law. For an in-depth treatment of compliance theory, see generally Christopher Slobogin & 
Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place (on file with author). 
 147. Id. at 55. 
 148. Tyler, supra note 140, at 288. 
 149. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
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long run.150 This Comment does not suggest that explicit balancing is 
inherently negative or inappropriate in the sex-offender context, 
considering the strong foothold the practice has gained as a method of 
judicial decision making.151 Rather, it suggests that implicit balancing 
can be problematic with severe consequences, as discussed above.152 
What, then, might be done to correct these potential problems? Put 
simply, if balancing is the approach judges choose to adopt in 
adjudicating sex offenses and other like crimes, the best solution is to 
ensure transparency and forthrightness in the factors and competing 
interests judges weigh when they arrive at their end decision.  
Avoiding implicit balancing will maintain the appearance of 
legitimacy, as well as neutrality, in the eyes of the public. As 
“[t]ransparency is the sine qua non of the common-law tradition we have 
inherited,”153 it makes sense for judges to explain their actions. If 
competing state interests in public safety or in controlling recidivist 
offenders outweigh a defendant’s liberty interests, the judge should 
explain the factors that she considered to the defendant, appellate judges, 
and the public at large. If a former rape counselor and stalking victim is 
selected to sit on a jury in a sex-crime case, it would be useful for the 
judge to explain why it was appropriate for such a person to sit on the 
jury. The factors that a judge considers when weighing a defendant’s 
rights against public safety must be pronounced to allow transparency 
and bolster legitimacy.  
A constant stream of explanations is not something that is required of 
judges in every decision they render, nor does this Comment assert that it 
should be; such a requirement would probably prove impossible for 
judges burdened with ever-increasing case loads. But if judges are 
concerned about the appearance of their courts’ legitimacy, explaining 
their decisions more fully and avoiding implicit balancing may provide a 
relatively simple solution.154 By simply articulating the reasoning they 
 
 150. See supra Part IV.B. 
 151. See supra Part I, at 2–3. 
 152. Supra Part IV.B. 
 153. Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 FED. 
CTS. L. REV. 177, 215 (2009). 
 154. In fact, Judge Nancy Gertner, a Massachusetts federal district-court judge who recently 
retired from the bench, uses just such a method of overcoming the legitimacy problems that can arise 
when judges implicitly balance. See Gertner, supra note 136 (“I have written several hundred 
opinions over the years—frequently when none was required. I wrote to explain my decisions to the 
public I felt privileged to serve, taking pains not to hide behind legalese. I wrote even when I was 
compelled by the law to do something with which I disagreed. I wrote precisely because I wanted to 
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use when balancing competing interests, and thus being more rather than 
less transparent in their efforts, judges may avoid the legitimacy 







make certain that my years as an advocate would not improperly affect my judging or the perception 
of its legitimacy.” (emphasis added)). 
 * JD candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
Thanks to Professor Shima Baradaran and the staff of the BYU Law Review for their helpful advice 
and suggestions. Special thanks to Erica Arnson. 
